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This paper develops a theory of voluntary provision of a public good in which a household’s decision
to engage in a form of environmentally friendly behavior is based on the desire to offset another behavior
that is environmentally harmful. The model generates predictions about (1) participation in a green-electricity
program at the extensive and intensive margins, and (2) changes in electricity consumption in response
to participation. We test the theory using billing data for participants and nonparticipants in a green-electricity
program in Memphis, Tennessee. High-consumption households are more likely to participate, and
they participate at higher levels. In terms of a behavioral response, households participating above
the minimum threshold level do not change electricity consumption, but those participating at the minimum
threshold increase electricity consumption 2.5 percent after enrolling in the program. The result is
based on identification strategies that exploit before-after differences between participants and nonparticipants,
and differences in the timing of enrollment among participants only. Despite the increase in electricity
demand upon the purchase of green electricity for the households with a “buy-in” mentality, the net
effect for the buy-in households is a reduction in pollution emissions, as the behavioral response is
not large enough to offset the environmental benefit of the green-electricity purchase.
Grant D. Jacobsen
Department of Planning, 
  Public Policy, and Management





School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
Yale University
195 Prospect Street




Vanderbilt University Law School
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
michael.vandenbergh@vanderbilt.edu  1
1.  Introduction 
Why do individuals and households engage in pro-environmental behavior? It often comes at 
substantial private cost for frequently diffuse and, on its own, inconsequential public, 
environmental benefit. Such behavior is nevertheless common, especially in the realms of energy 
efficiency and the reduction of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. Some behaviors, such as the 
purchase of a hybrid car, solar panels, or home weatherization products, can be justified on the 
basis of private payback periods, but the rate of return in many cases is too low to fully explain 
the prevalence of observed purchases. Other behaviors, such as the purchase of many green 
products, carbon offsets, and participation in green-electricity programs, operate more like 
charitable contributions.
1 With these behaviors, the primary goal is to promote environmental 
quality. This paper seeks to broaden the understanding of why we observe the latter type of pro-
environmental behavior, referred to here as voluntary provision of an environmental public good. 
  We begin with a theory of voluntary provision in which a household’s decision to engage 
in a form of environmentally friendly behavior is based on the desire to offset another behavior 
that is environmentally harmful. The interrelated behaviors that we consider throughout the 
paper are a household’s conventional electricity consumption and participation in a voluntary 
green-electricity program that provides financing for electricity generation from renewable 
sources of energy. In this context, the theory is built on the idea—which we ultimately test—that 
households purchase green electricity in order to mitigate disutility associated with pollution 
emissions generated through their own consumption of conventional electricity. We consider two 
variants of the model’s setup. In one version, a household cares about the exact amount of green-
electricity it purchases. In the other version, a household only cares about whether it purchases 
the minimum amount required to participate in the green-electricity program. For both cases we 
derive conditions for participation at the extensive and intensive margins for a green-electricity 
program that is based on the voluntary contribution mechanism. 
The model is also useful for examining how participation in the green-electricity program 
might affect demand for electricity more generally. Does participation in the green-electricity 
                                                 
1 According to survey data, the number of consumers buying “green products” increased from 12 percent in 2007 to 
36 percent in 2008, and remained at 36 percent in 2009 despite the recession (Mintel International Group, 2009).  
The voluntary carbon offset market grew over 15-fold between 2005 and 2008, increasing in size from $45 million 
to $705 million (Ecosystem Marketplace & New Carbon Finance, 2009). With respect to green electricity, over 5 
million residential and commercial customers participate in such programs in order to provide financing for the 
generation of electricity through renewable sources of energy (REN21, 2009).    2
program affect a household’s electricity demand? How might potential changes in electricity 
demand differ if participation is prompted with an offset motive or an offset motive combined 
with a “buy-in” mentality? And if electricity consumption changes, what is the net effect on 
emissions? It is easy to envision cases where households purchase a minimum amount of green 
electricity that is used to justify an increase in electricity demand; and if the increase in demand 
is greater than the purchase of green electricity, net emissions increase. With these questions in 
mind, we use the model to motivate the study of behavioral responses to voluntary provision of 
an environmental public good. 
We then test implications of the model using billing data from the Green Power Switch 
(GPS) program in Memphis, Tennessee. We obtained data from Memphis, Light, Gas and Water 
(MLGW) on monthly electricity bills between 2003 and 2008 for all 910 households 
participating in the GPS program as well as a sample of 30,012 nonparticipating households.
2 In 
total, the dataset consists of more than 779,037 monthly observations. The GPS program at 
MLGW began in 2005, so we have billing data for two years before and three years after 
households could first participate in the program. The first part of our empirical analysis 
examines the relationship between average electricity consumption and decisions about 
participation in the GPS program. The models are based on cross-sectional variation in 
household electricity consumption prior to enrollment in the GPS program, and we evaluate the 
relationship between consumption and program participation at both the extensive and intensive 
margins. The second part of our analysis examines whether households that participate in the 
GPS program change their electricity consumption after doing so—that is, we test for a 
behavioral response to participation. We employ a fixed-effects research design whereby 
identification of the behavioral response is based on comparisons between participants and 
nonparticipants, before and after enrollment in the GPS program. Specifically, we estimate 
models that exploit before-after differences between participants and nonparticipants, in addition 
to models that exploit before-after differences in the timing of enrollment among participants 
only. 
We find that households with greater electricity consumption are more likely to 
participate in the GPS program and to participate at a higher level. We interpret these results as 
                                                 
2 These data were provided in such a way that names and address were excluded from each observation to ensure 
anonymity of MLGW customers.   3
consistent with our model—meaning that participating in the green-electricity program is 
motivated in part by households feeling an obligation to offset, to some degree, the pollution 
emissions associated with their own conventional-electricity consumption. With respect to 
evidence of a behavioral response, we find that when participants at all levels are lumped 
together, GPS participation does not lead to a statistically significant change in electricity 
consumption. If, however, we consider only participants that enroll at the minimum level, we do 
find evidence of a behavioral response: these households increase electricity consumption 2.5 
percent after enrolling in the GPS program. This result, and the fact that it differs from that for 
participants at higher levels, is also consistent with our theoretical model, which links a “buy-in” 
mentality to expected differences in the behavioral response. Finally, given that in some cases 
the purchase of green electricity causes an increase in electricity consumption, we consider the 
net effect on emissions. It turns out that the 2.5 percent increase in consumption, which translates 
into 30 kwh/month for the average household, is less than the GPS minimum participation 
threshold of 150 kwh/month in green-electricity capacity. Hence, despite a behavioral response 
of increased electricity consumption, the net effect on environmental quality even for the buy-in 
households is a reduction in emissions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the most 
relevant literature and explains the contributions of our theoretical and empirical analysis. 
Section 3 develops the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the GPS program and our data 
collection and preparation. Section 5 describes our empirical methods and reports the results. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Relation to Existing Literature 
Economists often perceive pro-environmental behaviors, such as the voluntary purchase of green 
electricity, as examples of private provision of public goods. Important features of the standard 
model for privately provided public goods are developed in Bergstrom et al. (1986) and 
Andreoni (1988). The models are useful for understanding who provides public goods and who 
free rides.  More recently, this approach has been extended to explicitly model consumption 
decisions within green markets (Kotchen 2006) and participation in green electricity programs in 
particular (Kotchen and Moore 2007).   4
  A substantial empirical literature examines the private provision of environmental public 
goods, and many studies focus on green electricity. Several studies employ stated- or revealed-
preference techniques to derive estimates of willingness to pay for various types of green 
electricity (e.g., Goett et al. 2000; Champ and Bishop 2001; Roe et al. 2001). Other studies 
analyze factors that influence participation in specific green-electricity programs (e.g., 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2001; Rose et al. 2002; Clark et al. 2003). In general, the results of this research 
show that households frequently state a willingness to pay a premium for green electricity, yet 
actual participation in programs depends on household characteristics, attitudes related to the 
environment, and the existence of “warm-glow” motives.
3  
  The particular structure of a green-electricity program is another important factor that 
affects participation. Kotchen and Moore (2007) focus on the distinction between the two most 
common types of programs. The first are those based on the voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM). In VCM programs, households choose to contribute an additional amount of money 
each month, through their electricity bills, in support of green electricity, and the monthly 
contribution is fixed and independent of the household’s actual electricity demand. The second 
type of program is the green tariff mechanism (GTM). Households that participate in a GTM 
program pay a price premium for each unit of their actual electricity consumption, and the 
additional revenue is used to support green-electricity capacity. With the GTM, participation is 
more costly for households with greater electricity consumption, and Kotchen and Moore (2007) 
find that high-consumption households are less likely to participate in GTM green-electricity 
programs.  
  While understanding the determinants of participation in green electricity programs is 
important, it is also important to understand whether these programs lead to behavioral 
responses, such as an increase in energy consumption. In addition to our analysis in this paper, 
one other paper has examined whether enrolling in a green electricity program leads to changes 
in household energy consumption. Kotchen and Moore (2008) find that energy consumption fell 
for participants in a green electricity program that was based on a GTM. The magnitude of the 
effect, however, was within the range predicted by estimates of the price elasticity of demand for 
                                                 
3 A “warm-glow” motive captures the idea that households might participate in a green-electricity program because 
it makes them feel good, rather than because they care about any public benefits that may arise from reduced 
pollution emissions. See Andreoni (1990) for the general formulation of warm-glow motives for private provision of 
public goods.   5
electricity. Hence the study could not determine whether the behavioral response was due to the 
voluntary price premium or some other response of households from having offset their own 
emissions. In contrast, participants in the green electricity program under study in this paper 
contribute a fixed amount each month in support of green electricity through a VCM. Because 
the amount contributed is independent of how much electricity is consumed, any changes in 
consumption that we find in the present study can be attributed to reasons other than changes in 
the marginal price—namely a household simply knowing that it has offset some fraction of its 
emissions. 
  The literature on green-electricity programs has relevance to the understanding of more 
recently formed markets for voluntary carbon offsets. Offsets are based on the idea that agents 
need not reduce their own emissions in order to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
in the atmosphere; instead, they can pay someone else to reduce emissions and achieve the same 
effect on atmospheric concentrations. Typically, offsets arise through investments in renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, reforestation, or other projects that reduce emissions or sequester 
GHGs. While the purchase of voluntary carbon offsets is consistent with private provision of a 
public good, it differs because provision is related to other behaviors that provide a public bad 
(Kotchen 2009). For example, climate change awareness campaigns, which emphasize how 
many consumer choices lead to increases in carbon emissions, have been shown to increase 
purchases of carbon offsets (Jacobsen 2010). Though the connection is rarely made (somewhat 
surprisingly), participation in a green-electricity program is very similar to voluntary purchases 
of carbon offsets. Households aware that their conventional electricity consumption generates 
GHG emissions may seek to offset those emissions through the purchase of green electricity. 
  It follows that many of the concerns about green electricity mirror those about carbon 
offsets. Households contribute a third or more of U.S. GHG emissions (Dietz et al. 2009), and 
carbon offsets may be an important component of policy efforts to reduce household GHG 
emissions (Vandenbergh and Steinemann 2007). But questions are frequently raised about 
whether the emission reductions are “additional” in the sense that they would not have occurred 
without the purchase of green electricity or offsets.
4 Even if the emission reductions are 
additional, critics are still skeptical about the actual environmental benefits because of the 
                                                 
4 See Conte and Kotchen (2010) for a discussion about additionality and how concerns about it affect the price of 
carbon offsets.   6
potential behavioral response to such purchases. Many claim that carbon offsets are effectively 
indulgences that are used to assuage guilt and justify more polluting activities. In the context of 
green electricity, the same reasoning leads to questions about whether households that participate 
in programs consequently increase their consumption and thereby negate some (or all) of the 
supposed environmental benefits. More generally, the same type of behavioral response might 
exist across a broad spectrum of behaviors related to climate change or energy. Households that 
choose to weatherize their residence or purchase a more efficient heating and cooling system 
may be doing so, in part, to mitigate their own carbon emissions. Having done so, these 
households may become somewhat less concerned about curbing their emissions generated 
through other behaviors, and this behavioral response could potentially undercut the benefits of 
their initial action. In all cases, the explanation of the behavioral response is closely related to 
psychological theory on “moral licensing,” which is used to explain how individuals use their 
own “good” behaviors to self-justify “bad” behaviors.
5 To date, however, we are not aware of 
any empirical evidence on the moral licensing of environmentally related behaviors that is based 
on measurable and revealed-preference data. 
  The present paper makes a contribution by linking participation in a green-electricity 
program with the offset motive. The theoretical model is novel and closely linked to an empirical 
application. Our results are consistent with the theory and differ in predictable ways from those 
of Kotchen and Moore (2007, 2008). A further contribution of the paper is that we provide 
revealed-preference evidence of a moral-licensing (or indulgence) effect with respect to 
environmentally related behavior. We find that the purchase of green electricity does in fact 
result in greater electricity demand for some households, but importantly, the behavioral 
response is not large enough to negate within household environmental benefits.
6 
 
                                                 
5 With experiments designed to test racial and gender prejudices, psychologists find strong evidence in support of 
moral licensing (Monin and Miller 2001). A more related psychology study, though not focused on green electricity, 
involves a laboratory experiment that examines whether green purchases crowd out other types of altruistic 
behavior.  Mazar and Zhong (2010) find that University of Toronto students who purchased goods from a “green” 
store were less altruistic than students who purchased goods from a conventional store. A limitation of their study, 
however, is that students were assigned to one type of store or the other, rather than having the ability to choose 
which store they preferred. 
6 The paper also contributes to the literature on heterogeneous behavior in charitable giving. Similar to our results, a 
recent study shows that individuals who donate small amounts to charities do so for different reasons than do those 
that give large amounts. In particular, DellaVigna et al. (2009) find evidence that individuals who give small 
amounts to charity are more likely to give their donations to avoid the disutility of saying “no” to a request than 
those who make larger donations.   7
3.  Conceptual Framework 
Households may choose to participate in a green-electricity program through a voluntary 
contribution mechanism. An important feature of the model that distinguishes it from previous 
work (i.e., Kotchen and Moore 2007) is that households choose to participate in order to 
minimize disutility from knowing their conventional electricity consumption generates 
emissions. We also consider the implications of a potential “buy-in” mentality that motivates 
participation. 
A representative household with income m chooses between consumption of a numeraire 
x  and electricity consumption  y  at price  y p . The household’s utility maximization problem is 
written as  
 (1)  } : ) ( ) ( { max
, m y p x y h y f x y y x      , 
where  ) ( f  is strictly increasing and strictly concave,  ) ( h  is strictly increasing and convex, and 
} 1 , 0 {    is an indicator variable for whether the household is concerned about its impact on 
environmental quality.
7 The setup implies that while households of either type benefit from 
electricity consumption, only the type concerned with its own impact on environmental quality 
experiences disutility from knowing its conventional electricity consumption contributes to 
pollution emissions. The disutility may arise from knowledge about the impact of actual 
emissions or from subjective assessments about the impact of one’s own emissions. The first-
order condition that defines the solution to (1), denoted  y ˆ , is 
 (2)  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( y h p y f y      . 
The solution for type  1 is illustrated in Figure 1 at the level of  y ˆ  where the  ) ( f  and 
h() py curves intersect. Other elements of the figure are described below. We now consider the 
impact of introducing a green-electricity program, along with refinements on the motives for 
participation. 
 
3.1  The Availability of Green Electricity  
                                                 
7 The initial setup of our model is similar to that in Kotchen and Moore (2008); the only difference here is the 
further simplifying assumption that preferences are quasi-linear in x .    8
Consider a green-electricity program with participation structured around voluntary purchases of 
electricity  g  at price  g p , where  g  is measured in the same units as  y  (i.e., kilowatt-hours, 
kWhs). It is assumed that production of  g  does not generate emissions, and, following Kotchen 
(2009), households of the type that are environmentally concerned care about the net effect on 
emissions. We can thus write the utility maximization problem with the green-electricity option 
as  
 (3)    } : ) ( ) ( { max
, , m g p y p x g y h y f x g y
g y x        . 
Note that participation in the offset program is based on the amount of offsetting a household 
chooses to do, rather than on an all or nothing decision at 100 percent, which is the case under 
study in Kotchen and Moore (2008).  
  Assuming an interior solution for  y , but allowing the possibility for  0  g , we have the 
following first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions that define the solution to (3): 
 (4a)  0 ) ( ) (       g y h p y f y  ,  
 (4b) 0  g  and  0 ) (      g y h pg   and  0 )] ( [      g y h p g g  . 
Letting  } ~ , ~ { g y  denote the solution, we can make several useful observations. Condition (4b) 
implies that  0 ~  g  if and only if  ) ˆ (y h pg   . In words, if the price of green electricity exceeds 
the marginal disutility of emissions at the level of electricity demand without the offset option, 
then the household will choose not to offset any of its emissions. Clearly, this will always be the 
case for households of type   0 or if the price of green electricity is sufficiently high, and in 
both cases  y y ˆ ~  . If  0 ~  g , however, then it must hold that  g p g y h    ) ~ ~ (  , which implies that 
if a household offsets at all, it does so all the way to the point where the marginal disutility from 
net emissions equals the marginal cost of offsetting, i.e., the price of green electricity. This 
condition is illustrated at the level  ˜  y  in Figure 1. Moreover, offsetting will be less than (equal to) 
100 percent of electricity consumption if and only if  g p h ) ( ) 0 (    .
8 The case of less than 100 
                                                 
8 According to the model, households will never offset more than 100 percent of their emissions from electricity 
consumption. Such behavior would be possible, however, if the model were expanded to allow additional benefits to 
households of offset purchases, such as those often associated with warm-glow (Andreoni 1990) or status (Harbaugh 
1998).   9
percent is illustrated with  ˜  y  ˜  g  0 in Figure 1. The alternative case (not shown) would require 
the intercept of   h (0) py to lie above  py  pg.  
Let us for the moment add one feature to the model that is useful to motivate part of our 
empirical analysis. Among households of type  1, assume the direct benefit of electricity 
consumption is  ) (y f  , where  0    is simply a weight that allows heterogeneity of electricity 
demand before green electricity is available. Using (2) it is easy to verify that  0 / ˆ   d y d ; that is, 
without the green-electricity option, demand for conventional electricity is increasing in  . 
From this, it follows that satisfying the nonparticipant condition of  ) ˆ (y h pg    is more difficult 
with a larger  . In other words, the model predicts that, among households concerned about 
environmental quality, those with greater observed conventional-electricity consumption are 
more likely to enroll in the green-electricity program. A further empirical prediction is that such 
higher consumption households are expected to purchase more green electricity. This can be 
shown using (4a) and (4b) to verify that  0 / ~ / ~     d g d d y d . For simplicity hereafter, however, 
we continue to analyze the model as if  1   . 
Further observations, which are important for our empirical analysis, are based on a 
comparison of electricity consumption before and after the green-electricity option is available, 
assuming a household participates. We have already shown that participation requires 
pg   h (ˆ  y ), where  1, and implies  pg   h (˜  y  ˜  g  ). Substituting the latter condition into (4a) 
implies that conventional electricity consumption upon a household’s participation must satisfy 
 f (y)  py  pg, which corresponds with the quantity  ˜  y  in Figure 1. It is straightforward to verify 
using the figure that participating households will always (weakly) increase their conventional 
electricity consumption, that is,  ˜  y  ˆ  y . It is also easy to verify using the figure that net 
consumption will always (weakly) decrease, that is,  ˜  y  ˜  g  ˆ  y . Combining these results, we find 
that voluntary participation in the green-electricity program may be associated with an increase 
in electricity consumption, but the increase will be less than the amount of green electricity 
purchased.   
 
3.2  The Buy-In Mentality 
We now consider the possibility that when households choose to participate in the green-
electricity program, they care not about their overall net emissions, but rather, about simply   10
“buying in.” Our approach builds on Rose-Ackerman’s (1982) notion regarding motives for 
charitable giving. The idea is that if a “donor’s gift to a particular charity is at least equal to some 
minimum  z , the donor believes that he or she has ‘bought in’ to the entire range of services 
provided by the charity” (p. 195). With respect to purchases of green electricity out of concern 
for the environment, the idea is that if some minimum amount of emissions is offset, a household 
may feel it has done its part, and concern is no longer focused on actual net emissions. More 
formally, disutility from emissions no longer occurs conditional upon reaching the buy-in 
minimum. 
  We can modify the setup of our model to account for a buy-in mentality and to 
investigate its implications. Assume there is an exogenously given minimum threshold for the 
purchase of green electricity  z g  . Based on this, the preference parameter   now takes the 
form 












z g   
That is, a concerned household cares about the environmental implications of its own electricity 
consumption unless it buys into the green-electricity program, in which case it no longer feels 
any “guilt.” With this modification, the household utility maximization problem becomes 
 (6)    } or 0 , : ) ( ) ; ( ) ( { max
, , z g g m g p y p x g y h z g y f x g y g y x          . 
Let us denote the solution(s)  } , { g y . Clearly, the amount of green electricity purchased will take 
on only one of two values,  0  g  or  z g  . One complete solution to the problem is thus  } 0 , ˆ {y , 
which is simply the solution to problem (1) above. The other solution is  } , { z y , where  y  solves 
y p y f   ) ( , as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that  y y ˆ  , and it follows that conditional on 
buying-in to the program households will always increase conventional electricity consumption. 
Moreover, the increase will be greater than that which would arise if participation were not 
motivated with a buy-in mentality. 
  To determine which of the two possible buy-in solutions will arise, consider indirect 
utility in both cases: 
 (7a)  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ˆ 0 y h y f y p m V y g       
 (7b)  Vgz  m  pyy  f (y )  pgz   11
It follows that a household will buy-in to the offset program if and only if  0    g z g V V , which can 
be rearranged to imply the following inequality: 
 (8)  ) ˆ ( ] ˆ ) ˆ ( [ ] ) ( [ y h z p y p y f y p y f g y y      . 
Because the left-hand side is strictly positive and  0 ) ˆ (   y h , there exists a threshold buy-in 
expenditure, denoted  z pg   , that makes the household indifferent between the two possible 
solutions.
9 Accordingly, if  z pg  is less than (greater than)  , the household will (will not) buy 
into the offset program. Note, here again, that if we consider direct benefits from electricity 
consumption to take the form  ) (y f  , then satisfying (8) is only easier, implying that households 
with greater conventional-electricity consumption are more likely to participate in the green-
electricity program, even if they do so to simply buy in. 
  Condition (8) is also useful to investigate the different possibilities for the change in net 
consumption—i.e.,  y  z  versus  ˆ  y —when participation is motivated with a buy-in. By 
definition, the net effect will be positive (neutral, negative) when z  (,)y  ˆ  y , and it is easy to 
verify that all cases are possible. We can see that satisfying the inequality in (8) is possible for 
any value of z because  pg can vary without changes in  y  or  ˆ  y . Hence, even if the buy-in 
quantity is exceedingly high, participation is still possible if the price of green electricity is 
sufficiently low. In this case, the net effect can be positive. But, of course, if the buy-in quantity 
is very low, participation is also possible as long as the price of green electricity is not too high. 
It follows, in contrast to the previous version of the model where the net effect is always 
positive, that the net effect on electricity consumption—and therefore emissions—can be 
positive or negative when green electricity purchases are motivated with a buy-in mentality. 
 
4  Empirical Setting and Data Collection  
Memphis Light, Gas and Water (MLGW) is the largest three-service municipal utility company 
in the United States, serving more than 430,000 customers in Shelby County, Tennessee. MLGW 
purchases all of its electricity from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which has 
historically generated power using a mix of coal, natural gas, fuel oil, nuclear plants, and 
hydroelectric dams. Since April 2000, however, the TVA has added to its power mix electricity 
                                                 
9 In this knife-edged case, and only this case, the solution to maximization problem (6) is not unique.     12
generated through solar power, wind power, and methane gas. TVA’s development of these 
alternative energy sources is funded in part by the Green Power Switch (GPS) program, which is 
the voluntary green-electricity program under study in this paper.  
The GPS program is a partnership between TVA and several electricity distributors, 
including MLGW, that allows customers to voluntarily increase the amount of electricity 
generated from solar energy, wind energy, and methane gas. Households that voluntarily enroll 
in the program agree to pay an additional amount on each month’s energy bill. The exact amount 
added to the bill depends on how many blocks of green electricity a household chooses to 
purchase. Each block costs $4 per month and covers the approximate cost of producing 150 
kilowatt-hours (kWhs) of green electricity. Participating households must purchase at least one 
monthly block, but there is no limit to how many blocks a household can purchase. The vast 
majority of participating households purchase between one and five blocks, as we will show, and 
this translates into additional charges between $48 and $240 per year.  Enrollment in the program 
does not change the type of electricity delivered to a household—the electricity consumed by 
GPS participants comes from the same fuel mix as that for non-participants—but money 
contributed to the GPS program provides funding for additional investment in green-electricity 
capacity.   
MLGW initiated the GPS program in April 2005, and enrollment has increased steadily 
over time. Figure 2 shows the trends for new enrollment, cancelations, and active enrollment 
between the second quarter of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2008. The initial pulse of 
enrollment was spurred in part by an advertising campaign accompanied with direct-mail reply 
cards and bill inserts when the program was first rolled out. Based on information provided by 
MLGW, we know that households responding to reply cards and bill inserts accounted for 141 of 
the 299 total enrollments in 2005. Beyond the initial advertising campaign, the GPS program has 
been promoted continually on the websites of both MLGW and TVA, and customers can enroll 
in the program directly through these websites. Web-based sign-ups are the most common way 
to enroll, accounting for 619 of the 885 households enrolled at the end of 2008. Other ways to 
sign-up include over the telephone, emails to MLGW staff, and enrollment at environmentally 
based community events and trade shows. Figure 2 shows a steady increase in enrollment and 
exceedingly few cancelations.   13
Our empirical analysis is based primarily on two sets of data that we obtained from 
MLGW. The first contains information about household participation in the GPS program, 
including when each household enrolled and how many blocks it purchased. If a household 
dropped out of the program or changed how many blocks it purchased, that information is also 
included, as well as the date any change occurred. The second dataset contains billing data on 
electricity consumption for all 910 households that ever participated in the GPS program and a 
sample of 30,012 non-participating households.
10 These data begin in May 2003, which is two 
years before the start of the GPS program, and continue through December 2008. For every 
observation, we have both a premise identification number and a customer identification 
number.
11 Hence, if a customer switches locations during the course of the sample, the billing 
record at the new location is treated as a belonging to a new household. Similarly, if more than 
one customer occupies a premise during the sample period, we treat each customer’s tenure as a 
separate household. It follows that the maximum number of monthly observations for a 
household is 68, but there are fewer observations for households that established service after 
May 2003 or that terminated service before December 2008. 
We merge these two datasets together using each household’s unique identification 
number. With the merged dataset, we then generate several variables that are central to our 
analysis. Participant is a time-constant dummy variable for whether a household ever enrolled in 
the GPS program, and Blocks is a time-constant variable for the number of blocks that a 
household purchased. If a household ever changed its level of participation, Blocks indicates the 
maximum ever purchased; and in the case of non-participating households, Blocks equals zero.
12 
Enrolled is a time-varying dummy variable indicating whether a household was actively enrolled 
in the GPS program in any given month (i.e., billing cycle). Finally, kWh/day is a time-varying 
                                                 
10 Ideally the sample of nonparticipating households would be truly random; however, MLGW programmers used 
the following procedure to draw the sample. Selected households are those with an address such that the second 
letter of the street name is “a” and the 4
th digit of the address is “3”, “5” or “9.” Fortunately, for purposes of our 
analysis, the selection procedure does not appear to have any strong location biases. For example, the relationship 
between the population of a zip code and the number of households in our sample from that zip code has a strong 
positive correlation of 0.74. Throughout the paper we thus treat this sample as if it were randomly drawn.  
11 As mentioned previously, names and street addresses were excluded from all records to ensure the anonymity of 
MLGW’s customers. 
12 A total of 56 households changed their level of participation during the sample period. Nineteen households 
moved from one level of active participation to another, with 14 increasing blocks and 4 decreasing blocks. A total 
of 37 households dropped out of the program after having participated.     14
variable for the amount of electricity consumed in each month, derived by dividing electricity 
consumption in each billing cycle by the number of days in the corresponding billing cycle. 
In addition to these MLGW data, all households were matched to zip-code level 
demographic data from the 2000 U.S. Census and election data from the 2000 presidential 
election.
13 There are 35 different zip codes in the sample. Variables obtained from the Census 
include median household income, proportion with educational attainment of at least a college 
degree, share of households with families consisting of two people or more, population density 
(people per square kilometer), and race (proportion white and black). The electoral data include 
variables on the proportion of votes cast for George W. Bush, Albert Gore, and Ralph Nader in 
the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election.  
The complete dataset includes 779,037 monthly observations; however, some 
observations were dropped in the process of cleaning and preparing the dataset for analysis. We 
drop the first billing observation on record for each household because the closing data of the 
previous billing cycle is not observed, meaning that we cannot calculate the number of days in 
the first billing cycle to generate kWh/day (31,102 observations, or 4.0 percent). We drop 
observations with a billing period shorter than 26 days or longer than 36 days; these are 
considered irregular because meters are routinely read every 31 days (36,879 additional 
observations, or 4.7 percent). If the last observation for a household occurs before the end of our 
sample period, we drop this observation because electricity consumption may be abnormal 
during the month in which the account is cancelled (16,495 additional observations, or 2.1 
percent). If the first observation for a household occurs after the start of our sample period, we 
drop the 2
nd through 6
th billing record because households typically experience a period of partial 
occupancy when first moving in (72,417 additional observations, or 9.3 percent). Finally, we 
drop all records for which electricity consumption is recorded as missing, negative, or zero (346, 
8, and 3,922 observations, respectively, or collectively less than 1 percent). The final set of panel 
data used in our analysis includes 617,958 monthly observations and 20,205 households, 885 of 
which are participating households.  
                                                 
13 Precinct level data from the 2000 Tennessee Federal Election was downloaded from the Federal Elections Project 
(Lublin and Voss, 2001) and converted to zip-code level data using GIS software and Tennessee’s zip code 
tabulation area (ZCTA) shape file and voting district shape file from the U.S. Census Cartographic Boundary Files. 
These shape files are available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/. To convert the data from precinct to zip 
code level data, each precinct was linked to the zip code where its centroid is located.   15
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the demographic and electoral data for the cross-
section of 20,205 households. Note that these data are essentially zip-code level data weighted 
according the number of households in our sample within each zip code. Median household 
income is approximately $45,400 per year, 27 percent of the adults within the zip codes have 
obtained at least a college degree, the proportion of white residents is 54 percent, roughly 69 
percent of the households are families with two or more residents, and the mean population 
density is 906 persons per square kilometer. In terms of electoral preferences in the 2000 
presidential election, 42 percent voted for Bush, 56 percent voted for Gore, and just over 1 
percent voted for Nader. Transitioning to the data that we observe at the household level, the 
final row of Table 1 includes summary statistics for mean kWh/day, which is based on MLGW 
monthly billing data averaged within households and then between households. We find that 
mean electricity consumption is approximately 40 kWh/day, or 1,200 kWh/month.   
Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of the GPS participation levels (i.e., Blocks) 
among the 910 households that ever participated in the program. Nearly half (45 percent) of all 
households purchase only one block, and it is worth mentioning that this fact is itself consistent 
with the existence of a buy-in effect. Not surprisingly, as the number of blocks increases, there 
tends to be fewer households participating. One clear exception, however, is the spike at 5, 
which is likely due to the layout of the website sign-up form that solicits levels of enrolment up 
to five blocks, beyond which households must enter an “other” category and fill in their desired 
level. Overall, the average level of participation among participants is 2.3 blocks at a cost of 
$9.20 per month, or $110.40 per year. 
 
5  Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to the empirical analysis with a focus on three primary questions: What explains 
the extensive and intensive margins of participation in the Green Power Switch (GPS) program? 
How does a household’s participation affect its conventional-electricity consumption? And what 
is the net effect on environmental quality? 
 
5.1  The Participation Decision 
The conceptual framework developed in Section 2 is built around that idea that households may 
choose to participate in the GPS program in order to offset emissions from their conventional-  16
electricity consumption. If the offset motivation does in fact exist, it is reasonable to expect, 
ceteris paribus, that households with greater electricity consumption are more likely to 
participate in the GPS program. To evaluate whether this pattern holds in the data, we begin with 
estimation of a cross-sectional probit model in which we regress the dummy variable for each 
household’s participation decision, Participant, on its average electricity consumption along with 
the corresponding demographic and electoral data at the zip-code level. For this model, and all 
other cross-sectional models, we use kWh/day as an explanatory variable that is averaged over 
only those months when households are not participants in the GPS program. This avoids the 
potential endogeneity, which we investigate later, of electricity consumption changing due to 
having participated in the GPS program.
14 For all cross-sectional models we cluster standard 
errors at the zip-code level to account for potential spatial correlation of the errors and also for 
the unit upon which the demographic and electoral variables vary. 
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the estimated marginal effects of two probit 
models. In the first we include kWh/day (divided by 10 to ease interpretation), and in the second 
we include an additional quadratic term for kWh/day to allow a more flexible functional form. 
We find significant differences between participants and nonparticipants in the sample.
15 Based 
on the model in column (1), we find that an increase of 1 kwh/day on average increases the 
probability by 2.3 percent that a household participated the GPS program. This result, which 
occurs after controlling for the demographic and electoral variables at the zip-code level, is 
consistent with a simple comparison of means: kWh/day is significantly greater for participants 
than nonparticipants (49.6 versus 39.6, t = 10.52, p < 0.01). According to the model in column 
                                                 
14 Though the results are not reported here, we also carryout the cross-sectional analysis using two alternative 
constructions of average electricity consumption. Our procedure of using only electricity consumption in months 
prior to participation implies that 81 participant observations are not included in the models because they do not 
have at least six months of data prior to having participated in the GPS program. If, however, we simply take 
average electricity consumption using all months, and therefore include these 81 additional observations, the results 
are very similar to those reported in Table 3. Another alternative that we try is to use a detrended kwh/day that 
accounts for potential bias due to having different months over which averages are taken for participants and 
nonparticipants. But again, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 3.     
15 We report and discuss unweighted results throughout the paper; however, we also estimate specifications in which 
each observation is weighted to account for the different sampling probabilities of participating households (Pr =1) 
and non-participating households (Pr = 0.05). The primary difference between the weighted and unweighted 
regressions is that the weighted estimation produces coefficients that are substantially smaller in models where the 
left-hand side variable includes participants and nonparticipants. There is no difference in terms of which 
coefficients are statistically significant. Coefficients in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 are unaffected by weighting 
because the sample is limited to participants only. All coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5, which present the 
fixed effects estimates discussed later in the paper, are identical or extremely similar in both the weighted and 
unweighted estimates.   17
(2) the quadratic term is statistically significant, and allowing this more flexible functional form 
increases the magnitude of the estimate such that an increase of 1 kWh/day on average increases 
the probability by 3.6 percent that a household has participated in the GPS program. Among the 
zip-code level variables, only the share of votes for Ralph Nader is statistically significant. While 
the magnitude is small, households from zip codes with a greater share of votes for Nader are 
more likely to be participants in the GPS program.   
  Turning now to the intensive margin of participation, we estimate a truncated regression 
model in which the level of participation, Blocks, is regressed on the same covariates.
16 We find 
that greater conventional electricity consumption is associated, in a statistically significant way, 
with the purchase of more blocks in the GPS program. According to the linear specification in 
column (3), an increase of 1 kWh/day is associated with participants purchasing approximately 
one-half more of a 150 kWh block of green electricity. The non-linear specification in column 
(4), however, suggests that the marginal effect of kWh/day on the number of blocks purchased is 
increasing and concave. One may interpret this result as evidence that the positive marginal 
propensity to offset emissions diminishes with higher levels of electricity consumption. Among 
the zip-code level variables, a notable result is that for median household income, we find some 
evidence that income is negatively associated with the number of offsets purchased. Though it 
would be better to have data on income at the household level, this result even with zip-code 
level data is important because it provides evidence against the alternative explanation that both 
conventional electricity consumption and GPS blocks are normal goods, which could possibly 
explain the positive correlation. Instead, we have attempted to control for income and, if 
anything, find that it is negatively associated with the number of GPS blocks purchased. Hence 
the pattern of results supports the notion that the intensive margin of GPS participation is 
motivated, at least is part, by the desire for households to offset their own emission from 
electricity consumption. 
  The other results in Table 3 are for models that combine the extensive and intensive 
margins into one estimator. The tobit models in columns (5) and (6) essentially combine the 
probit and truncated models into one (Greene 2002), and, not surprisingly, the qualitative results 
are very similar. Most importantly, kWh/day continues to have a positive and statistically 
                                                 
16 The truncated regression models are based on the sample of all participating households, with the exception of 
those households that did not have a billing cycle on record prior to their enrollment in the GPS program. This 
sample consists of 801 observations.   18
significant effect on participation when both the extensive and intensive margins are considered 
simultaneously. Finally, we estimate the negative binomial models in columns (7) and (8) 
primarily as a robustness check. Count data models are useful for our application because of the 
preponderance of zeros, along with the high number of counts at a low numbers of blocks, which 
then taper off relatively quickly. Even with the different functional form assumption of the 
negative binomial model, we again find that participation in the GPS program increases, but at a 
decreasing rate, with a household’s level of conventional electricity consumption. Moreover, 
household income, at least when measured at the zip-code level, does not have a statistically 
significant effect, but the vote share going to the Green Party’s Ralph Nader does have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on participation, which is consistent with results of the 
previous models. 
 
5.2  The Behavioral Response to Participation 
We now consider the question of whether or not participation in the GPS program affects 
household electricity consumption. A prediction of the conceptual framework developed in 
Section 3 is that conditional on participation in the GPS program, a household will (weakly) 
increase its electricity consumption. Moreover, if participation is motivated with a buy-in 
mentality, the model predicts that the increase in electricity consumption will be even greater.  
  We begin testing the effect of GPS participation electricity consumption using fixed-
effects models that compare changes in the electricity consumption of participants before and 
after GPS enrollment to changes in the electricity consumption of nonparticipants over the same 
period. Our basic specification is   
 (9)  it i it it it v Enrolled day kWh       δM ) / ln(  
where, as defined previously,  it day kWh/ is average daily electricity consumption for household 
i  in billing cycle t ;  it Enrolled  is a time-varying dummy variable indicating whether household 
i  is participating in the GPS program in billing cycle t ;  it M  is a vector of month-year variables 
throughout the sample period for the share of days in household i ’s billing cycle t that falls in 
each month (sixty-seven in total);
17  vi is a household-specific intercept; and  it   is a normally 
                                                 
17 Note that if billing cycles aligned perfectly with calendar months, the month-year variables would be simply 
month-year fixed effects. The advantage of our approach is that we more accurately attribute electricity consumption   19
distributed error term. In all estimates, we cluster standard errors at the household level, which 
makes statistical inference robust to potential serial correlation of residential electricity 
consumption. 
  The coefficient of primary interest is , as it provides an estimate, based on a comparison 
between participating and nonparticipating households, of how electricity consumption changes 
upon participation in the GPS program. While specification (9) estimates the average effect of all 
participants regardless of the number of blocks that a household purchases, we later relax this 
assumption when testing for evidence of the buy-in effect. It is important to recognize that the 
empirical model controls for all time-invariant differences between households, but it does not 
control for time-varying differences. Hence the key identification assumption in our baseline 
empirical strategy is that in the absence of GPS participation, the trend in electricity consumption 
would have been the same in both participating and nonparticipating households. This is the 
“common trends” assumption that is required in both fixed-effects and difference-in-differences 
research designs (Meyer, 1995).  
While the common trends assumption cannot be tested formally, we can examine the 
existence and direction of potential bias using different subsets of the data. To address the 
potential concern that participating and nonparticipating households may have different trends in 
electricity consumption, we estimate a model identical to specification (9) but that includes only 
participating households. This model takes advantage of a different identification strategy based 
on variation in the timing of participation among participating households only.  
Another potential source of bias, however, is that the timing of GPS enrollment is 
endogenous. Suppose, for example, that a household experiences a change in personal ideology 
and decides to take personal steps to conserve energy. The household might simultaneously 
decide to enroll in the GPS program while also making behavioral changes at home to reduce 
energy consumption. Under such a scenario, the endogeneity would cause negative bias in the 
estimate of  . To address this possibility, we estimate another version of specification (9) that 
includes all nonparticipating households and only participating households that joined the GPS 
program in 2005, the year the program first began. These households comprise 35 percent of the 
participating households. For such initial joiners of the GPS program, it is reasonable to assume 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the time periods in which common shocks actually took place. We did, however, estimate models in which we 
simply use month-year fixed effects based on the end of a household’s billing cycle and the magnitude of coefficient 
estimates are nearly identical and levels of statistical significance are unchanged.   20
that participation was caused by the (exogenous) introduction of the program rather than a 
simultaneous change in personal ideology. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of   in specification (9) for all three identification 
strategies: full sample, participants only, and initial joiners with nonparticipants. The point 
estimate in the full sample model of 0.003 implies that enrollment in the GPS program leads to 
0.03-percent increase in household electricity consumption, but not only is the effect small, it is 
also not different from zero with any meaningful degree of statistical significance. Despite the 
entirely different estimation strategy of the participant only model, the coefficient is very similar 
at 0.006 and also not statistically distinguishable from zero. Finally, when considering only the 
initial joiners and nonparticipants the coefficient increases to 0.008 but is still not statistically 
significant. Together, these models provide no evidence that household electricity consumption 
changes upon participation in the GPS program, at least when participation at all levels of the 
intensive margin are considered jointly. 
We now test for evidence of the buy-in effect by relaxing the assumption that the 
behavioral response to participation in the GPS program is uniform across all levels of the 
intensive margin. Specifically, we test for differential responses between households that 
purchase one block (i.e., the minimum level) and those that purchase more than one block. Our 
approach is to simply expand the empirical specification to 
 (10)  it i it it it it v Enrollment Enrollment day kWh          δM ] 1 [ ] 1 [ ) / ln( 2 1   
where the only difference is that we estimate separate  s for participating households that 
purchase one block and households that purchase more than one block. In effect, we estimate 
different behavioral responses for those participating in a way consistent with the buy-in effect 
and those that are not. Again, we estimate specification (10) with a fixed-effects model, cluster 
standard errors at the household level, and employ all three of the identification strategies.
18   
Table 5 reports the three different estimates of  1   and  2  , and we find differences 
between them. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find that, on average, households 
participating in the GPS program at the minimum level increase their electricity consumption 
after participating. The magnitude is such that they increase consumption by approximately 2.5 
percent, and the result is all three models is statistically significant (at the 90-percent level with a 
                                                 
18 We also estimated models in which we test for differences between other levels of participation, but we do not 
report the results because we found no statistically significant differences.    21
two-tailed test, or the 95-percent level with a one-tailed test). In contrast, we find no evidence 
that households purchasing more than one block change their electricity consumption, which is 
consistent with our previous results. In fact, the point estimate in all three models, though not 
statistically different from zero, is negative. Additionally, tests of whether  2 1 ˆ ˆ     are rejected in 
all three cases with p-values of .037, .054, and .086 for columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. 
Hence we interpret these results as providing evidence of the buy-in effect for participation in the 
GPS program. Not only do those purchasing the minimum amount of green electricity increase 
their electricity consumption; their behavioral response differs from other participating 
households that purchase more than one block. What is more, a striking feature of the results is 
how robust the estimates are across the three distinct identification strategies. In particular, the 
control group for comparison is different in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, yet the results remain 
very similar. 
 
5.3  Net Consumption and Environmental Quality 
Households voluntarily purchase green electricity as a more environmentally friendly alternative 
to conventional electricity. But if participation in a green-electricity program prompts an increase 
in electricity demand, the impact on net generation of conventional electricity, and therefore 
environmental quality, is unclear. 
  Referring back to the theoretical model, let us first consider participating households that 
seek to avoid disutility from their own emissions, but are not motivated with a buy-in mentality. 
We predict that despite a potential increase in electricity demand, net generation of conventional 
electricity for these households will not decrease, while net emissions will. Consistent with this 
prediction, we find no significant change in electricity demand for households that participate 
beyond the minimum threshold. In other words, we find no behavioral response to participation 
for these households. Among them, the average level of participation is 3.4 blocks, which 
translates into a green-electricity capacity of 510 kwh/month, or 6,120 kwh/year. To get a sense 
for the environmental impact, we use the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s published 
emission rates for the Tennessee Valley Authority (eGrid 2010). Focusing on the three primary 
pollutants of sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide, we find that the average (non-
buy-in) household offsetting 6,120 kwh/year of conventional electricity with emission-free   22
green-electricity reduces their own annual emissions by 8,129 lbs of CO2, 35 lbs of SO2, and 15 
lbs of NOX. This translates into a 43-percent reduction in a household’s emissions. 
  Calculating the effect for households that participate because of a buy-in effect requires 
taking account of the behavioral response. As predicted by the theory and confirmed with the 
empirical results, the behavioral response of increased electricity demand is larger for those 
households that appear to take a buy-in approach to the GPS program. Among the participating 
households that purchased only one block, or equivalently, 150 kwh/month of green-electricity 
capacity, household electricity consumption increased 2.5 percent on average after participation. 
The increase in consumption, however, remains less than the purchased capacity of green 
electricity, which implies that net consumption of conventional electricity declines, and 
emissions decline despite the increase in electricity demand. This follows because a 2.5 percent 
increase in electricity demand is 30 kwh/month, compared to the 150 kwh/month of green-
electricity capacity. In effect, with the buy-in effect, 20 percent of the green-electricity emission 
reductions are offset by increased electricity consumption. Overall, for these households, the 
average net reduction of their own annual emissions is 1,913 lbs of CO2, 8 lbs of SO2, and 3 lbs 
of NOX. This translates into a 10-pecrent reduction in a household’s emissions.  
 
6  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper investigates why households engage in pro-environmental behavior and whether such 
behaviors are in fact beneficial for the environment. We develop a theory of voluntary provision 
of an environmental public good that is motivated by the desire to offset other behavior that is 
environmentally harmful. We apply the theory to a setting in which households may purchase 
green electricity in order to mitigate disutility associated with pollution emissions generated 
through their own consumption of conventional electricity. We consider cases in which a 
household purchases green electricity because it cares about its actual level of emissions or 
because it simply wants to buy-in to the program. In both cases, the model predicts that, ceteris 
paribus, households with higher electricity consumption are more likely to purchase green 
electricity. Moreover, in the case where households care about the actual level of emissions, the 
model predicts that high-consumption households are likely to purchase more green electricity. 
The model also generates testable predictions about the expected behavioral response to 
participation in the green-electricity program. Because the purchase of green electricity affords   23
participating households a cost effective way to offset concerns about their own emissions, the 
model predicts that participating households will increase their electricity consumption; and the 
increase is expected to be larger for households that simply buy-in to the program. 
  The empirical results provide evidence in support of the offset and buy-in motives for 
participation in a green-electricity program. We find that households with greater electricity 
consumption are in fact more likely to participate in the green-electricity program and to 
participate at a higher level. Regarding the behavioral response, we find that when participating 
households at all levels are considered together, there is no statistically significant change in 
electricity consumption after participation. If, however, we consider separately the participating 
households that enroll at the minimum level—i.e., households most likely exhibiting a buy-in 
mentality—then we do find a statistically significant behavioral response. These households 
increase electricity consumption 2.5 percent after enrolling in the green-electricity program. 
Notably, this result is robust to identification strategies based on before-after differences between 
participants and nonparticipants, and between the timing of enrollment among participants only.  
  The fact that electricity consumption increases for some households that purchase green 
electricity raises the question of whether the net effect on emissions is positive or negative for 
the environment. We find that the behavioral response of increased electricity consumption 
remains less than the minimum capacity of green electricity that a household must purchase. 
Hence the net effect is a reduction in pollution emissions. This may not always be the case, 
however, and our results underscore the importance of taking the behavioral response into 
account when designing and evaluating the effectiveness of green-electricity programs. 
Fortunately existing green-electricity certification programs appear to recognize this need and 
address it with minimum purchase requirements. The Green-E national standards for certification 
in the United States, for example, requires that capacity based green-electricity programs selling 
block products, as in the program that we study here, must require a minimum block purchase of 
100 kwh/month. Our results suggest that this minimum purchase is large enough to ensure that 
the behavioral response is not sufficiently large that green-electricity programs become a 
counterproductive means for reducing emissions.     
  While the theoretical and empirical results of this study have clear implications for the 
evaluation of green-electricity programs, they also contribute to the understanding of green 
consumer behavior more generally. The supposed environmental benefits of green goods and   24
services are often questioned for reasons beyond the credibility of marketing claims. As 
discussed previously, arguments are frequently made that the availability of green options, and 
the numerous government programs that subsidize their consumption, are problematic from an 
environmental standpoint because they may simply promote greater consumption. The 
arguments are perhaps most salient in the context of carbon offsets where critics emphasize 
concerns about moral licensing, whereby carbon offsets are indulgences used to justify even 
greater emissions. The problem with these claims, however, is that empirical evidence based on 
observable and quantifiable behavior is generally missing. Our results thus contribute to the 
debate, as we find real evidence for a behavioral response consistent with greater consumption—
but it is not large enough to reverse the intended environmental benefits. A question we leave to 
future research, however, is how green consumer behavior interacts with other dimensions of 
behavior and concern. Perhaps one of the most interesting relationships to examine is the 
interaction between green-consumer behavior and public support for mandatory environmental 
policies, which could be either complements or substitutes. 
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Figure 1: Relative electricity consumption for type  1 with and without  

















































































































New Enrollment Cancellations Active Enrollment
 
Figure 2: New enrollment, cancellations, and active enrollment in MLGW’s  
Green Power Swith program  
   29
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Median income ($1,000s)  45.377  18.529  10.734  116.200 
Bachelor's degree (1=yes)  0.270  0.155  0.045  0.658 
Race  white  (1=yes)  0.544 0.309 0.013 0.941 
Family household (1=yes)  0.686  0.112  0.270  0.911 
Population density (#/km
2) 905.636  524.727  33.292  2027.226 
Vote Bush (1=yes)  0.421  0.241  0.013  0.758 
Vote Gore (1=yes)  0.564  0.243  0.220  0.981 
Vote Nader (1=yes)  0.012  0.007  0.001  0.038 
kWh/day 40.023  26.508  0.030  741.795 
Notes: Summary statistics are based on 20,205 households. Demographic data 
are from the 2000 U.S. Census. Electoral data are from the Federal Elections 







Table 2: Frequency of Green Power Switch enrollment levels 
 
 # of 
Blocks  # of Households 
Annual 
Contribution 
 (per household) 
Proportion  
of participants 
1 395  $48 0.45 
2 263  $96 0.30 
3 81  $144  0.09 
4 40  $192  0.05 
5 101  $240 0.11 
6 5  $288  0.01 
7 2  $336  0.00 
8 7  $384  0.01 
9 1  $432  0.00 
10 8  $480  0.01 
11 1  $528  0.00 
12 2  $576  0.00 
15 2  $720  0.00 
20 1  $960  0.00 
30 1  $1,440  0.00 
Average # of Blocks: 2.3 ($9.20/month or $110.40/year) 
Notes:  This table displays how many households have ever enrolled at 
each number of blocks. There is a total of 910 households. For 24 
households that changed their enrollment levels, this table reports the 
household’s greatest level of enrollment.   
 
Table 3: Marginal effects from cross-sectional models of the extensive and intensive margins of Green Power Switch participation 
 
 Probit  Truncated  Tobit  Negative  binomial 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
KWh/day       0.0023***  0.0038***  0.0533***  0.1774***  0.0058***  0.0100***  0.1423***  0.2010*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0173) (0.0512) (0.0018) (0.0028)  (0.0270)  (0.0341) 
(kWh/day)
2  -- -0.0001** -- -0.0039*** -- -0.0002**  --  -0.0038*** 
   (0.0000)  (0.0013)  (0.0001)    (0.0008) 
Median income ($1,000s)  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0048  -0.0093*  0.0001  0.0000  -0.0047  -0.0052 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0014) (0.0014)  (0.0221)  (0.0222) 
Bachelor's  degree  (1=yes) 0.0661 0.0687 0.3148 0.3823 0.1603 0.1670  2.2759  2.2880 
  (0.0596) (0.0591) (1.0114) (0.9902) (0.1365) (0.1348)  (2.1130)  (2.1162) 
Vote Gore (1=yes)  0.0557  0.0578  -1.0117  -0.4217  0.1090  0.1147  0.0863  0.2410 
  (0.0824) (0.0809) (1.1629) (1.1325) (0.1896) (0.1849)  (3.0131)  (3.0335) 
Vote Nader (1=yes)  2.3504***  2.3279***  -1.7788  -5.4937  5.3862***  5.2956***  87.7194***  87.2393*** 
 (0.7047)  (0.7033)  (11.6345)  (11.4648)  (1.6453) (1.6332) (30.2631) (30.5049) 
Population density (#/km
2)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Race white (1=yes)  0.0415  0.0429  -0.8681 -0.2735 0.0836 0.0876 0.5215  0.6434 
              (0.0660)  (0.0648)  (0.8141)  (0.8395)  (0.1523)  (0.1486)  (2.4394)  (2.4589) 
Family household (1=yes)  -0.0046  -0.0035  0.0627  0.3754  -0.0036  0.0005  -0.0878  -0.0748 
              (0.0625)  (0.0621)  (0.7368)  (0.6772)  (0.1414)  (0.1399)  (2.0994)  (2.1102) 
            
Observations  20,121 20,121  801  801  20,121 20,121  20,121  20,121 
R-squared                    
Log  likelihood  -3018.50 -3013.49 -1469.46 -1461.95 -4500.28 4493.18  -4422.80  -4418.55 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects, which are reported at the means for the nonlinear models. KWh/day is divided by ten in all 
regressions to ease interpretation of the coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the zip-code level are reported in parentheses. One, two, and 






Table 4: Fixed-effects models of the effect of Green Power 
Switch participation on household electricity consumption 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Full Sample 
Participants 
only 
Initial joiners and 
nonparticipants 
Enrolled in GPS  0.003  0.006  0.008 
              (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
      
Observations 617,958  42,646  592,563 
R-squared     0.387  0.539  0.381 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(kwh/day). Household fixed effects are 
included in all regressions along with month-year variables for each 
billing cycle. Standard errors clustered at the household level are 
reported in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisk(s) indicate 








Table 5:  Fixed-effects models of the effect of Green Power Switch 
participation at different levels on household electricity consumption 
 






Initial joiners and 
nonparticipants 
One block     0.023*  0.025*  0.027* 
              (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
More than 1 block  -0.012  -0.007  -0.010 
              (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
      
Observations 617,958  42,646  592,563 
R-squared     0.387  0.539  0.381 
Notes:  Dependent variable is ln(kwh/day). Household fixed effects are 
included in all regressions along with month-year variables for each billing 
cycle. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in 
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisk(s) indicate significance at the 90-, 
95-, and 99-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 